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My basic understanding of Boulos’ claims starts with his title, i.e., that Newton was
responsible for a “revolution in scientific reasoning.” The concept at the center of the discussion
is “empirical success” which for “a theory” he characterizes as “not limited to prediction, but
also generates reliable measurements of the parameters of the phenomena.” According to
Boulos this results in a “method of answering important theoretical questions empirically by
measurement from phenomena” made possible via “systematic dependencies that make the
phenomena into measurements of theoretical parameters.” This is illustrated (argued for) by
considering the case of the argument for the moon’s gravitation towards the earth which appears
in Propositions III and IV, Book III of the Principia. Two attendant claims are also made: (i)
that this “model of evidential reasoning exploits these agreements in a way that the stakes are
raised for rival theories” and (ii) that in contrast to those who claim later developments are to be
seen as confirmation of Newton’s position “we claim that the developments by Newton's
successors on perturbation theory helped realise Newton’s ideal of empirical success.”
I lay no claim to being a Newtonian scholar. The last time I looked at the history of
seventeenth century physical science with any degree of seriousness was more than thirty years
ago. Consequently, portions of my remarks are merely raising questions instead of making
comments on Boulos’ claims.
There is a voluminous literature on the issue of Newton’s scientific methodology. As a
sampling over an extended period of time which represents a variety of points of view consider:
Snow (1927); Burt (1932); Blake (1933); Burke (1936); Strong (1951) and (1957); Crombie
(1957); Kargon (1965); McGuire (1967) and (1970); Palter (1967); Shapere (1967); Achinstein
(1990); and Stein (1990). Making an assessment of Newton’s contributions to scientific
methodology is difficult for a variety of reasons. First, we have writings over a roughly sixty
year period to assess. Moreover, these writings range from multiple edition publications to
private correspondence and personal notes. Second, we have Newton’s well-known antipathy to
criticism and its impact on his public positions. Third, we have the fact that we are dealing with
a seventeenth century author and his context. Extreme care must be given to not unintentionally
provide an anachronistic interpretation. Where does the Boulos claim fit in the landscape
represented by the extant Newtonian literature? What is new or different about the Boulos
claim? Is there some problem of Newtonian interpretation for which Boulos proposes a
resolution? I am unsure about the answer to any of these questions. I believe that all of the
authors listed above would acknowledge that Newtonian science is mathematical in at least two
ways -- that the ideal of scientific knowledge is demonstrative, i.e., it should be laid out in the
Euclidean manner and that those aspects of nature which admit of mathematical representation
are fundamental. Consequently, both systematic dependencies and measurement per se are
standardly assumed aspects of Newtonian science. Exactly, what beyond this is Boulos
claiming?
Boulos’ claims rest on Newton’s “Rules of Reasoning in Philosophy” and their utilization in
the argument for the moon gravitating towards the earth. Before coming to my set of questions I
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wish to set out both these aspects of the Newtonian position and an additional one. The Rules as
they appear in the 3rd edition (without their commentaries) are as follows:
RULE I: We are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and
sufficient to explain their appearances.
RULE II: Therefore to the same natural effects we must, as far as possible, assign the same
causes.
RULE III: The qualities of bodies, which admit neither intension nor remission of degrees,
and which are found to belong to all bodies within the reach of our experiments, are to be
esteemed the universal qualities of all bodies whatsoever.
RULE IV: In experimental philosophy we are to look upon propositions collected by general
induction from phænomena as accurately or very nearly true, notwithstanding any contrary
hypotheses that may be imagined, till such time as other phænomena occur, by which they
may either be made more accurate, or liable to exceptions.

The first two rules concern the parsimony of causal relationships while the second two
concern conditions connected with induction. The set of four rules did not exist in all three
editions of the Principia. In the first edition a set of nine hypotheses introduced Book III. In the
second edition they were broken up into three groups–Rules of Reasoning in Philosophy, one
Hypothesis which was no longer placed at the beginning, and Phenomena. To the first two
former hypotheses, now relabeled as rules, a third was added. The extended discussion of this
third rule is addressed to Cartesians, to mechanists in general, and to Leibniz in particular. In the
third edition a the fourth was added and a fifth existed in draft form. The fifth is an antiCartesian polemic which was never published. Koyre (1960). These changes over time
complicate determining the role the Rules actually played in Newton’s reasoning.
Correspondence further complicates the task by making it appear as if the latter Rules were
constructed to deal with critics rather than guide reasoning.
A paraphrasing of the essence of the Newtonian argument for the moon gravitating towards
the earth is as follows:
•
•
•
•

•
•

(Proposition III): The force by which the moon is retained in its orbit tends to the earth
(from Phen VI and Prop II or III Book I) and is inversely as the square of its distance of
its place from the earth’s center.
(Proposition III Cor.): This force in descending to the earth’s surface will continually
increase as the square of the inverse of its height.
(Proposition IV a): Let us assume the mean distance of 60 diameters.
(Proposition IV b): If we imagine the moon, deprived of all motion, to be let go, so as to
descend towards the earth with the impulse of all the force by which it is retained in its
orb, it will in the space of one minute of time, describe in its fall 15 Paris feet, 1 inch,
and 1 line 4/9. (From Prop XXXVI, Book I or Cor IX, Prop IV Book I)
(Proposition IV c): At the surface of the earth in the space of one second of time it will
describe 15 Paris feet, 1 inch, and 1 line 4/9.
(Proposition IV d): A pendulum oscillating seconds in the latitude at Paris will be 3 Paris
feet 8 lines ½ in length. The space which a heavy body describes by falling in one
second of time is to half the length of this pendulum as the square of the ratio of the
circumference of a circle to its diameter, and is therefore 15 Paris feet, 1 inch, and 1 line
7/9.

Commentary on Pierre Boulos

•
•
•

3

(Proposition IV e): Therefore, the force by which the moon is retained in its orbit
becomes, at the very surface of the earth, equal to the force of gravity which we observe
in heavy bodies there.
(Proposition IV f): Therefore, the force by which the moon is retained in its orbit is the
very same force which we commonly call gravity; (Rules I and II)
(Proposition IV g): for, were gravity another force different from that, then bodies
descending to the earth with joint impulse of both forces would fall with a double
velocity.

This rendition overlooks the moves made in Proposition III in order to achieve the inverse
square law for the moon. The other crucial presupposition is that the mean distance is 60
diameters. Neither was obviously the case.
Propositions V, VI, and VII then generalize this result. There is the explicit invocation of
Rules I, II, and IV in the Scholium to Proposition V and the explicit invocation of Rule III in
Corollary II of Proposition VI.
One of my concerns is that considering only this argument utilizes a very small portion of
the Newtonian corpus–a few pages at the start of Book III in the 3rd edition of the Principia.
There is only a single and rather extraordinary case contained here -- the case for the moon
gravitating towards the earth. There are both other sources of methodological pronouncements
in Newton than the four rules in Book III and quite different studies than those undertaken in the
Principia. How complete and generalizable a view do we have on the basis of this portion of the
Newtonian corpus. Consider the following from the Opticks:
“As in Mathematiks, so in Natural Philosophy, the Investigation of difficult Things by the
Method of Analysis ought ever to precede the Method of Composition. This Analysis
consists in making Experiments and Observations, and in drawing general Conclusions from
them by Induction, and admitting no Objections against the Conclusions, but such as are
taken from Experiments, or other certain Truths. For Hypotheses are not to be regarded in
experimental Philosophy. And although the arguing from Experiments and observations by
Induction be no Demonstration of general Conclusions; yet it is the best way of arguing
which the Nature of Things admits of, and may be looked upon as much stronger, by how
much the induction is more general. And if no Exception occur from the Phaenomena, the
conclusion may be pronounced generally. But if at any time afterwards any Exception shall
occur from Experiments, it may then begin to be pronounced with such Exceptions as occur.
By way of this Analysis we may proceed from Compounds to Ingredients, and from motions
to the Forces producing them; and in general from Effects to their Causes, and from
particular Causes to more general ones, till the Argument end in the most general. This is
the Method of Analysis: And the Synthesis consists in assuming the Causes discover’d, and
establish’d as Principles, and by them explaining the Phenomena proceeding from them, and
proving the Explanations. ” (Opticks 4 ed., 404-405).

This quotation reveals what I believe to be a key aspect of the Newtonian methodology–that
it is at least a two step process involving both analysis and synthesis. Of these two components
it is analysis which receives the lengthy discussion in the above quotation. Synthesis is taken as
better understood than analysis as the standard presentation of geometry is an illustration of
synthesis. Synthesis in natural philosophy, as well as in geometry, functions to demonstrate
interrelationships. Both aspects are involved in doing science-- simply analysis or simply
synthesis will not do.
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The argument for the moon gravitating towards the earth is part of which aspect of science?
The propositions up to Proposition X in Book III are arguing for it and after Hypothesis I its
consequences are being explored. In other words the first ten propositions involve the method of
analysis and those following Hypothesis I are components of the method of synthesis. This is
supported by the Preface to the first edition where Newton says: “ In the third book I give an
example of this in the explication of the System of the World; for by the propositions
mathematically demonstrated in the former Books, in the third I derive from the celestial
phenomena the forces of gravity with which bodies tend to the sun and the several planets. Then
from these forces, by other propositions which are themselves mathematical, I deduce the
motions of the planets, the comets, the moon, and the sea.” (Principia, xviii)
Now I am ready to raise my set of questions beyond the one already raised about the
location of the Boulos position in the Newton literature.
If the argument we have considered is reasoning to principles rather than from principles, in
what sense are we answering “theoretical” questions? In what sense are we dealing with
“empirical success” of “a theory” when reasoning to principles? For that matter, in what sense is
it appropriate to use “theory” when discussing Newton?
1) Are other examples from the Newtonian corpus illustrating this mode of
reasoning? If so, what are they and in what ways are they similar and in what
ways different? If not, then how can this case be considered representative of
scientific reasoning?
2) What would be required to consider something a revolution? Revolution requires
change. How is the Newtonian reasoning a change? What is it a change from?
What were its contemporary competitors? Moreover, not all changes are
revolutionary. What about a change makes it a revolutionary change? A setting
out of both the background and contemporary alternative positions would be
needed in order to assess whether there was a revolution. In addition the
scientific revolution is multi-dimensional involving a switch from a geocentric to
a heliocentric astronomy, the conversion from Aristotelian to Newtonian
dynamics, adherence to and the development of a mechanical philosophy and a
change in the view about the status of first principles. Singling out a particular
component for special consideration seems likely to neglect complex
interrelationships.
3) In what way were further developments not simply confirmation? Perhaps
Boulos’ position provides and alternative way of viewing the relationship of data
and theory other than confirming data, but that remains unclear to me. With no
specific references given it is hard to assess the basis on which the other claim
was made. Moreover, in the Principia itself lunar theory was not taken as a
confirming instance as it was part of the method of analysis not part of the
method of synthesis.
4) How does this purported Newtonian methodology up-the-ante for competing
theories? What is presupposed in this claim? Why does a competitor have to
agree that identical measure results are disadvantageous to their position? How
are two effects determined to be the same? Isn’t such a determination theory
dependent? Is there an illustration of how this impacted a competing theory?
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